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Abstract
This paper argues that noetic studies, contemplation, or theoria ought to take greater pre-
cedence in education than is currently the case. Our modern focus on and fascination with 
information technologies serves in many ways to thwart and to discourage the cultivation 
of noetic studies and the pursuit of wisdom in schools. The suggestion throughout this 
paper is that if the significance of pre-modern and non-technological ways of knowing 
could be made clear and convincing to education stakeholders, it seems likely that the 
appropriateness of such pursuits might be recognized, and their practice rendered more 
frequent as a kind of corrective to technological education.
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Precis
Cet article soutient que les études en « sciences noétiques, » la méditation ou la con-
templation  devraient actuellement occuper une plus grande place qu’elles ne le font 
en matière d’éducation. Aujourd’hui, notre fascination pour les technologies de l’in-
formation, et l’importance qu’on y accorde, sert à bien des égards à contrecarrer et à 
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décourager la culture des études en sciences noétiques et la quête de la sagesse dans les 
écoles. Cet article s’applique à démontrer, que si l’importance des moyens pré-modernes 
et non technologiques liés au savoir pouvait être rendue claire et convaincante aux yeux 
des responsables des politiques éducatives, il semble probable que la pertinence de telles 
activités pourrait être reconnue, et leur pratique rendue plus fréquente, constituant une 
sorte de « correction » à l’enseignement technologique.
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Introduction: 
A Recollection of Pre-Technological Ways of Knowing
Today, we often use the word contemplation to name any sort of deep thinking. How-
ever, the ancient roots of this word are rich with a specific meaning that has largely been 
forgotten and that merits recollection. It is correct to suppose that contemplation (Lt. 
contemplatio; Gk. theoria) names a kind of cognitive activity; however, the ancient sense 
of this word must be distinguished from critical-analytic reasoning (ratio) that is the 
mainstay of our modern educational efforts. Rather than describing the laborious cogni-
tive activity of a thinking subject standing over against its object (Lt. ob-iectum, mean-
ing “thrown against”) as it moves from point to point in a line of reasoning, the ancient 
sense of contemplation refers to direct, non-linear knowing; it involves not separation 
but rather the union of knower with what is known in the act of seeing (theoria); not 
through the discursiveness of ratio but in the immediate apprehension of intellectus does 
the loving gaze of contemplation unify seer with what is seen. And where the discursive 
thought of ratio is indeed a form of work, the passive, receptive gaze of intellectus is 
not; rather, it is an effortless, immediate grasping of (or perhaps being grasped by) what 
is seen. Contemplative knowing is therefore always associated not with toil but instead 
with leisure. Our language still pays lip service to this important relation between con-
templation, leisure, and education inasmuch as our word school is derived from the Greek 
word for leisure (schole). In ancient understanding, intellectus was always esteemed 
more highly than ratio as the mode of our perfection in genuine happiness (Gk. euda-
imonia; Lt. beatitudo). Aristotle uses the word immortalization (to athanatizein, 2001, 
Nicomachean Ethics, X.vii.8) to describe the activity of the intellectus in relation to what 
is perfect or best (the Ariston); today, however, the significance of the intellectus and its 
contemplative activity has been drastically diminished (if not entirely forgotten) in favour 
of exclusive attention to the discursive skills of the ratio—a fact not lost on contempor-
ary contemplative writers on education like Laurence Freeman (Freeman, 2012, p. 5). 
Responding to this need, educators like Charles and Patricia Posnett advocate for the 
incorporation of simple contemplative activities within the school days of elementary 
children (Posnett, 2013).
Where Latin authors used the terms ratio and intellectus to distinguish the dis-
cursive power of thinking from contemplative cognition, Greek authors spoke in terms 
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of dianoia (thought) and noesis (intellection). Dianoetic thought includes the deductive, 
inductive, and evaluative use of fundamentals or principles (archai) discovered by the 
mind, whether these underlie mathematics, science, the arts, or stand as the basic cultural 
presuppositions or “first things” of a culture or community. In any case, dianoia applies 
these archai downward into the realm of human activity; noesis, by contrast, takes up 
(anairesis) all such archai towards their true beginning or ground (Arche). In this regard, 
noesis names that desire of the intellectus not just to see (theorein), but to see what is in 
its entirety, and to grasp through its gaze the very ground of all that is.
Traditionally, the pursuit of wisdom, or philosophy (Gk. philia-sophia: literally 
“the love of wisdom”) has been called the “science of being qua being” (Aristotle, 2001, 
Metaphysics IV.ii; 1005a.5), or of the things that are (ta onta) due to its character as a 
noetic activity as opposed to a scientific or dianoetic one. However, the noetic pursuit of 
wisdom is not the exclusive preserve of philosophers. The vipassana meditation of the 
Buddhist, the samatha meditation of the yogin, and the contemplative prayer of the Chris-
tian or Muslim practitioner all embody the upward movement (anairesis) of the mind 
towards its ground. Moreover, the activity of the intellectus is not to be conceived of as 
an elite activity. Plato remarks in his Phaedrus that lovers of beauty (philokalos) relish 
the noetic movement of the intellectus, as do musical souls (mousikou tinos) or, for that 
matter, souls of a loving (erotikou) or erotic nature (Plato, 1961, 248d). In short, anytime 
we come to know what is by loving—that is, when we experience knowing as joy in the 
appreciation of our union as seers with what is seen—we engage in theoria. There are, in-
deed, many such modes of pursuing wisdom and engaging our students in contemplative 
activities in today’s classroom.
If we are to understand the ancient meaning of contemplation properly, it is im-
portant to recognize that noetic and dianoetic activity may never be completely divorced 
from one another. Rather, the ancients held knowing to be a unity of ratio and intellec-
tus—a simultaneous functioning of the two. In today’s schools, where testing and ac-
countability structures predominate, however, the dianoetic applications of reason are cul-
tivated to the exclusion of noesis. But according to ancient understanding, the exclusively 
dianoetic machinations of ratio cannot bring about a knowledge of the Highest Good 
(Summum Bonum) that might enable us to know the true Measure (Metron) of all the oth-
er goods we enjoy; even the most adept movements of ratio cannot tell us which innova-
tions are good and which are not, nor can they tell us to what end we ought to innovate. 
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In other words, the sort of learning that predominates in schools today is insufficient to 
cultivate wisdom. Without also attending to and cultivating the noetic component of our 
rationality, we are left with only our own diverse passions and appetites as the means to 
make decisions about such things.
Reawakening awareness of the intellectus in our pedagogy and incorporating 
noetic thinking into the classroom need not be considered an onerous or impossible task; 
such activity might occur anywhere and at any time. For instance, scientific investigations 
might, where an openness of spirit is cultivated, give rise to philosophic questions—so 
too mathematical studies, the investigation of literature and mythology, as well as reflec-
tion on our own experiences of love and suffering. Indeed, any sort of basic understand-
ing (intellectus) that we have gleaned about anything already presupposes the operations 
of intellectus, which sees or apprehends the truth. Intellectus is active in the student’s 
immediate grasp of the axioms (axiomata) and principles (archai) of mathematics and 
the various sciences. It therefore stands at the beginning (arche) of all our thinking, but 
it also appears at the end of a line of reasoning when ratio moves us towards yet anoth-
er seeing of a truth. Intellectus is active in the student’s witness to beauty, whether that 
beauty takes a physical or non-physical form; moreover, the joy of intellectus in uniting 
with its beloved is especially sought out by students in relation to their friends, music, art, 
dance, or any other pursuit they love for the beauty they find in it.
Since the operation of intellectus is omnipresent in thinking, the challenge of 
schole is not simply to see (theorein), but to take what one sees upward (anairein) toward 
its source noetically. Put another way, the challenge of schole is to offer the intellectus 
evermore-beautiful sights and joyful experiences of beholding the Lovable. The danger 
for students is not so much that they will not see, but rather that they will suppose that 
they have already seen everything there is to see—that they will close themselves off to 
the investigation of what is, that they will refuse to cultivate the broadest and most open 
form of listening, supposing their own cognition of beauty has already shown them what 
is truly Beautiful. In short, the danger for students in thinking is for them to suppose that 
they know what they do not know due to their ignorance or unfamiliarity with higher and 
better sights worth seeing.
Our current emphasis in schools on being accountable to the predetermined goals 
and outcomes of the educational system is well known to everyone who has taught in 
the last twenty years. Our inordinate stress on high-stakes testing and assessment across 
Contemplation as a Corrective to Technological Education 463
Canadian Journal of Education / Revue canadienne de l’éducation 36:3 (2013)
www.cje-rce.ca
Canada and the United States, with its demand that students demonstrate their knowledge 
of the correct answers and that they provide evidence of what they know, certainly does 
little to promote an openness to wonder, a readiness to question, or an eagerness to know 
the extent of their own ignorance. In fact, our educational system is arguably quite dam-
aging noetically inasmuch as it encourages students to beware of demonstrating that they 
do not know—certainly, they are never to take delight in such a discovery! Yet delight 
in the discovery that leads one to know thyself (gnothi seauton) is precisely the pleasure 
associated with the noetic movement towards the highest sights. The dearth of contempla-
tive activity (with its associated joys) in today’s schools is well documented in massive 
studies performed by groups like the Garrison Institute, which have taken great pains to 
map out the current state of contemplative education in schools (2005). In particular, the 
Garrison Institute points to the need for the incorporation of contemplative educational 
activities into our schools as a counterweight to our mainstream concerns with outcomes, 
assessment, and accountability (2009, p. 2).
How is it, then, that the exercise of intellectus is so ubiquitous, yet so little attend-
ed to and largely dismissed in modern education? How is it that our attention in schools 
has almost completely shifted to the cultivation of the ratio? Why is it that our schools 
indulge in the discursive work and toil of reason without inviting students to enjoy the 
leisure of intellection? Most troublesome is the effect that this lopsidedness has had on 
mass societal consciousness of reality. When all of our knowing becomes a matter of 
standing over against objects in a position of control, use, and mastery, we cease to see 
the contemplative or relational aspect of knowing as loving. Our awareness of our own 
innate ability to gaze upon (theoria) what is and to experience loving union with what 
is through the contemplative movements of the intellectus fades, yet our craving for this 
sort of knowing remains. The result of this modern confusion has been that we seek to 
gratify our desires for such union through the only means of knowing with which we are 
in any way deeply familiar: namely, the calculative subject-object knowing of the ratio. 
Hence, our deepest desires to know take their peculiarly modern form of technological 
mastery through the adept use and integration of information technologies. What fol-
lows in this paper is an exploration of our modern technological confusion. I argue that 
the solution to our modern day confusions about technology is not evermore education 
technology, but rather the incorporation of contemplative studies that might, with the 
relaxation of our focus upon assessment and accountability structures, cultivate noesis 
throughout the school day.
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On the Deformations of Contemplation  
in the Allure of Technological Homogeneity
It is incorrect to suppose that theoria, or the immediate seeing of intellectus, is not cur-
rently a component of our educational efforts; rather, any time that understanding (intel-
lectus) is acquired, the capacity of intellectus for seeing is involved. Buddhist scholar 
Robert Thurman (2006) makes a similar point when he remarks that the contemplative 
mind exists in all cultures, and that it can be quite misleading to speak of our own cul-
ture as lacking contemplative minds. He explains, “When we make that claim, we are 
rather lamenting the deplorable contemplative states within which the common mind 
is absorbed” (p. 1766). Thurman offers television as an example of the sort of contem-
plative trance in which millions of people imbibe “for hours on end, day after day, year 
in and year out” (p. 1766). Unfortunately, he explains, it is a trance “in which sensory 
dissatisfaction is constantly reinforced, anger and violence is imprinted, and confusion 
and the delusion of materialism is constructed and maintained” (p. 1766). Hence, “when 
we talk about seeking to increase and intensify contemplative mind in our culture, we are 
actually talking about methods of transferring contemplative energies from one focus to 
another” (p. 1766).
Thurman’s astute observations about television also apply to our current fascina-
tion with computers and the Internet—especially in educational circles where the fulfill-
ment of ICT outcomes is mandated and strictly enforced both in curriculum documents 
and as part of Teacher Professional Growth Plans (TPGPs). Teachers are under constant 
and ever-increasing pressure to bring the latest technologies to bear upon their pedagogy. 
The fervour of this pressure becomes all the more peculiar when we recognize that it is 
doubtful if teachers anywhere have ever experienced similar pressures and threats that 
they must use television or radio broadcasts (let alone books, paper, pens, and pencils) 
with their students. Indeed, there seems to be a special kind of seeing that Information 
Technology (IT) is believed to afford, such that its use has taken on a strange power in 
our understanding (intellectus) of ourselves and of what it means to know. The pecu-
liar allure of IT arises on two counts. On the one hand, IT offers us the false promise of 
knowing everything, or, at the very least, of gaining access to seemingly infinite infor-
mation about the world-as-object; on the other hand, it purports to make available an 
ersatz transcendence, or a kind of substitute for the joy experienced relationally in a true 
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community of being with others, with the world, and with the divine. Put more simply, in 
terms developed and clarified by Martin Buber, computer technologies promise us a form 
of omniscience in the realm of I-It experience while at the same time offering us assur-
ances about our connectivity to all other users in a communal I-Thou world-wide web of 
being (Buber, 1970). IT has, in this regard, become a widely accepted substitute for the 
genuine spiritual exercise of pursuing wisdom, or immortalizing.
With a high degree of prescience at the beginning of the age of personal comput-
ers, the Venerable Chan Buddhist Master Hsuan Hua referred to computers—like their 
predecessors in television and radio—as “people eaters” and “man-eating goblins” inas-
much as their use typically causes human beings to “forget about everything else” (Hua, 
1985). Ironically, the promise of computers—literally “electric brains” in Chinese— 
to increase student engagement and educational accessibility may actually serve most 
powerfully to undermine our awareness of and attention to what is—the everything else 
of which Hsuan Hua speaks. Also writing at the beginning of the age of computers, the 
Canadian philosopher George Grant challenged the notion that computers are simply 
neutral instruments in our hands:
The phrase “the computer does not impose” misleads, because it abstracts the 
computer from the destiny that was required for its making. Common sense may 
tell us that the computer is an instrument, but it is an instrument from within the 
destiny which does ‘impose’ itself upon us, and therefore the computer does im-
pose. (1986, p. 23)
The destiny of which Grant speaks is that dominant form of knowing that treats 
the world strictly as an object for mastery by the critical-analytic intellect, which un-
derstands everything only in terms of its use. Following Grant’s (1986) insights about 
technology, we might say that our modern educational penchant for IT has been formed 
from within this destiny wherein “information is about objects, and comes forth as part 
of that science which summons objects to give us their reasons” (p. 24). Moreover, Grant 
calls the technological destiny that brought forth the computer “homogenizing” (p. 24); 
when the only legitimate way of knowing the world is to treat it as an object, then what is 
known must always be “thrown over against” (ob-iectum) oneself. In such an homogeniz-
ing environment, what is known is not known through a relation of love in which the be-
loved is known by the lover—as Romeo knows Juliet, as the philosopher loves wisdom, 
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or in theoria, as seer and seen are united. Quite the opposite, in technological society, true 
knowledge of any object is premised upon the suspension of love in objectivity. As “the 
ontology of the age” (Grant, 1986, p. 32), technological knowing—the knowing in which 
the computer finds its origin—is founded upon the denial of love as a legitimate way of 
knowing (Grant, 1986, p. 35–78; cf. Palmer, 1993, p. 1–16). Using Buber’s distinctions, 
modern technological knowing is an all-encompassing I-It knowing that dominates to the 
exclusion of I-Thou knowing (1970). Most important for our study is Grant’s insight that, 
at the heart of the technological ontology from which has arisen our modern penchant for 
computers necessarily lies the rejection of both philosophy and contemplation—of what 
Arthur Zajonc has referred to as “an epistemology of love” (Zajonc, 2006, p. 1742–1759).
There is a true lie (alethos pseudos) at the heart of our fervour and our faith in 
technology that has resulted in a mass deformation of consciousness; it is a lie about the 
things that are (ta onta), or what Socrates in the Republic calls a lie about the most sov-
ereign things (ta kyriotata) to what is most sovereign (to kyriotato) in ourselves (Plato, 
1961, 382ab). Certainly, an infinite number of things may be known as objects, just as an 
infinite number of things might also be used. The sort of infinite knowing that IT offers 
us in this regard depends upon our becoming users. The lie and consequent deformation 
of consciousness in our acceptance of IT’s alluring promise is not that a myriad of things 
might be known as use-objects by computer users; nor is it that IT can provide us with 
access to this sort of knowing. The lie is rather that adopting the stance of the user is the 
only way of knowing the world, that being cut off from the network is akin to being cut 
off from all knowing, and that all knowledge and enjoyment is necessarily mediated to us 
through our status as users and, specifically, by our use of computer technologies.
In order to understand the deformation of consciousness that has occurred, it is 
valuable to examine St. Augustine’s famous distinction between use (uti) and enjoyment 
(frui). In his work, On Christian Doctrine, Augustine writes:
There are some things, then, which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be used, 
others still which we enjoy and use. Those things which are objects of enjoyment 
make us happy. Those things which are objects of use assist, and (so to speak) 
support us in our efforts after happiness, so that we can attain the things that make 
us happy and rest in them. We ourselves, again, who enjoy and use these things, 
being placed among both kinds of objects, if we set ourselves to enjoy those 
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which we ought to use, are hindered in our course, and sometimes even led away 
from it; so that, getting entangled in the love of lower gratifications, we lag behind 
in, or even altogether turn back from, the pursuit of the real and proper objects of 
enjoyment. (Augustine, www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/doctrine.html)
To enjoy a thing means to accept it for and by itself and to find joy in it. To use a 
thing, by contrast, is to make it the means to obtain what we enjoy. According to Augus-
tine, the world of things must be used, but not enjoyed; only God may be enjoyed. Put 
another way, we ought only to enjoy the things of this world inasmuch as we use them to 
enjoy God, in which all things participate by virtue of their being—that is, by virtue of 
their goodness, their beauty, and their truth.
Our fascination with computer technologies has led us to confuse use (uti) with 
enjoyment (frui). Certainly, human beings are regularly beset by temptations and confu-
sions whereby we, as Augustine notes above, set ourselves to enjoy those things which 
we ought to use. The inappropriate enjoyment of worldly things is not a specifically 
technological development, however; the particular danger of computer technology lies 
more in its similarity with sorcery as a magical means of supposing that we might enjoy 
by use what must not be used through becoming its users. That is, when we relate to the 
transcendent—i.e., that which may be enjoyed but never used—as computer users who 
seek out true community through a relation of technological mastery, we are essentially 
engaged in the same activity as the ancient sorcerer who attempts to compel the gods to 
work favours for him. This paper suggests that genuine contemplative practices are the 
best way to extricate both students and teachers from this delusion.
The allure of IT confuses us in two respects about use (uti) and enjoyment (frui). 
First, it purports to offer us all knowledge of the things that are (ta onta). Indeed, the 
Internet is believed to make all the world’s knowledge immediately accessible at the click 
of a few buttons. It offers users access to seemingly infinite information—certainly more 
than can be contained in any book—that may be found instantly and that is constantly 
being updated in real time. This technological promise of infinite knowledge is best illus-
trated by the web’s most popular search engine, Google, whose name is a misspelling of 
the mid-twentieth century term googol. Officially defined as “10 raised to the hundredth 
power” (New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993), the term (along with its variant 
googolplex) was originally coined in 1938 by the nine-year-old nephew of mathematician 
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Edward Kasner in order to name the largest countable number this side of infinity, or 
“one, followed by writing zeroes until you get tired” (Kasner and Newman, 1940). 
Google Corporation self-consciously sells itself as a kind of God-like knowing of all that 
human beings have ever come to know or understand. This practically infinite knowledge 
of the world is made available only to users such that knowing by using is held to be the 
exclusive means towards omniscient—and in this regard, immortalizing—knowledge. 
However, by making our participation in divine omniscience conditional upon our status 
as users, computer technology obscures our awareness of what constitutes genuine im-
mortalization—namely, the pursuit of wisdom. We are duped into believing that becom-
ing users is the only way to know ta onta; indeed, there is a deeper and more fundamental 
knowing that is lost to our consciousness when it becomes over-ridden with the fervour 
of such technological promises. This obscured form of knowing does not entail use, and it 
arises as a testimony to the truth that not all things derive their enjoyment from use. This 
realization is experientially available to all of us whenever we adopt the relational I-Thou 
attitude wherein the one who sees is united by loving gaze with the seen; it is this relation 
that is cultivated and embodied in genuine contemplation or theoria, and it is precisely 
this sort of knowing that the googol-knowing or the all-knowing of IT implicitly denies. 
Hence, in its offer to provide us with access to all knowing, IT appears to tell the truth, 
but in fact invites us to suppose we know what we do not know. As students and teach-
ers, when we are enticed by the fervour surrounding technological innovation, we easily 
become ignorant of our own ignorance, and hence are liable to what Gareth Matthews has 
called “pretentious learning” (Matthews, 1980, p. 94). In this regard, our faith in comput-
er technology serves to impede the pursuit of wisdom in schools.
Second, at the same time as it offers us omniscient, world-as-object knowledge, 
IT simultaneously proposes to deliver an ersatz or substitute mode of theoria. Particularly 
among young people, constant interface with networked communications provides them 
with a feeling that they are connected in an I-Thou relation to their friends, to their inti-
mates, and, more generally, to the things that are. Moreover, such technologies provide 
this theoretical substitute as something that is mediated by use (uti)—that is, inasmuch 
as we become users of technology, we are connected to everyone and everything else. 
The geometric complement of this claim, of course, is that inasmuch as we are not users 
of technology, we are not connected to anyone or anything else. I surmise that it is for 
this reason that so many of the young people I have taught report a deep spiritual need 
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for their technological devices. Indeed, the allure of technology for young people—far 
more than its claim to offer us infinite knowledge of the world-of-objects, which per-
haps entices teachers to a much greater degree—is that it espouses the ability to render 
the enjoyment (frui) of a transcendent I-Thou relation through the mode of use (uti) that 
is associated with I-It experience. IT claims for itself magical powers to render known 
through use (uti) what cannot be known through use, but only through enjoyment (frui). 
This delusion, which has begun to be recognized by modern psychologists, results in 
compulsive Internet use, depression, and loneliness (van den Eijnden, Meekerk, Vermults, 
Spijkerman, Engels, 2008, 655–665). Josef Pieper’s philosophic writings from 1966 are 
particularly enlightening when read in light of what has become the mass phenomenon of 
ersatz transcendence in the googolplex of technology:
Where considerations of pure ‘usefulness’ reign supreme, there will appear, 
almost inevitably, certain phony replicas, counterfeit imitations of the genuine 
religious, artistic, and philosophical endeavour. The danger lies in the difficulty of 
recognizing the deception, or rather, the self-deception; it seems, since all areas 
are “covered,” there is nothing missing. The place of genuine prayer, for instance, 
may be taken by some “magical” practice, the attempt to put supernatural powers 
at our disposal, even to make God himself into a mere functional potency that 
becomes part of the utilitarian purposes of worldly calculations. (p. 35)
It is important to remember that genuine theoria can never be cultivated through 
the medium of use. As Pieper points out, “We can only be theoretical in the full sense of 
the word ... so long as the world is something other (and something more) than a field 
for human activity, its material, or even its raw material” (1981, p. 116–117). Theoria is 
rather destroyed by the medium of use, and inasmuch as we are simply users, we are not 
theoretic in our disposition toward reality. As long as we conceive of ourselves solely as 
users—and even if we crave transcendence as so many young people do, but are duped 
into believing that transcendence is a matter of use—we are necessarily incapacitated 
for the pursuit of wisdom. In this regard, our fascination with ICT outcomes may serve 
as perhaps one of the greatest impediments to the cultivation of wisdom in schools. As 
Pieper remarks, “the suicide of philosophy is this—once the world begins to be looked 
upon merely as the raw material of human activity, it is only a step to the abolition of the 
theoretical character of philosophy” (1981, p. 117). When offered as a function available 
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only to users, the promise of theoretical transcendence serves as a deformation of con-
sciousness and marks the destruction of theoria. It distorts our sense of what it means to 
engage in the contemplative life by deluding us into believing that our I-It experience of 
computer-use might be a genuine replacement for enjoyment of the I-Thou relation that 
arises only where use is not present. In diverting us from genuine theorizing—an activity 
not arising in the atmosphere of use (uti), but in the leisure (schole) of simple enjoyment 
(frui)—our faith in technology cuts us off from that highest activity of the best part of 
ourselves in relation to its most perfect object. Aristotle calls this activity “happiness” 
(eudaimonia, 2001, Nicomachean Ethics X.vi.2), and this happiness is identical with the-
oria as the true mode of our immortalization.
Academics such as R. W. Burniske have suggested that these technological dan-
gers can be avoided simply by limiting computer use in schools, by exposing students 
more consistently to the non-cyberspace world of nature, by using computers to access 
information about the real world of nature, and by using online discussion boards to 
discuss the relation between technology and nature (2005, p. 50–52). However, I contend 
that philosophic, meditative, or contemplative practices among both students and teach-
ers are, in fact, the best cure for our technological delusions; such practices involve the 
recognition of all that is refused by the homogenizing technological ontology. Simply by 
seeing the truth that is beheld through contemplation, we are released from all the techno-
logical delusions that might befall both students and teachers in the modern school. The 
Ven. Hsuan Hua remarks:
Don’t get scared when you hear me call television, radios, and computers 
man-eating goblins. No need to be afraid. My hope is that you will clearly rec-
ognize these things for what they are. Once you recognize them, then electric 
gadgets lose their power to confuse you. That’s enough to know. But if you’re 
confused by them, then they can gobble you down.
The same principle applies to beauty. If the sight of a pretty figure has the power 
to confuse you, then you’ve been swallowed by a man-eater. If the sight of money 
confuses you, then you’ve just been devoured by a man-eater. If your purpose is 
to establish a big reputation, and fame confuses you, then you’ve just been swal-
lowed by the goblin of fame. If good food confuses you, although you feel you’ve 
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just enjoyed a tasty dish, in fact, the food has eaten you. The food has eaten your 
spiritual soul, your Dharma-body. It has eaten up your wisdom, and left you as 
stupid as can be. (1985)
Contemplation and the Danger  
of Seeing Only What We Have Made
A second problem that arises when we accept the technological ontology is that, if we 
assume that all of our knowing depends upon our becoming users, we come to accept that 
we only really know those things that we ourselves have made. As makers and as users of 
what we have made, our gaze is narrowed and fixed upon the products of our own cre-
ative powers; consequently, it is diverted from what we have not made—the everything 
else of which Hsuan Hua speaks. Our technological gaze therefore lacks the openness 
of the philosophic gaze that seeks to know reality as such; but the very possibility for 
theoria rests upon our ability to be receptive to what is apart from our own making and 
control. What Pieper refers to as the precondition for wisdom’s pursuit—namely, the 
acknowledgement that reality is “good in itself” (1981, p. 120) even apart from being 
mastered, made, or transformed by human efforts—is absent where the goodness of what 
is depends upon its being made by us according to our specifications and personal prefer-
ences. James Schall write:
Teachers and students are in the same condition with regard to truth—they stand 
before something neither the one nor the other made. The modern idea that the 
only truth is the ‘truth’ we ourselves make is a narrow view that quickly cuts us 
off from what is. (2001, p. 65)
We should therefore be much more cautious about the pervasive manner in which 
technology is being incorporated into classroom learning for our young, impressionable 
students; the narrowing of their gaze that occurs as a result of their continual immersion 
in the technological paradigm of knowing-as-making affects not only the way that they 
see the world, but also the way that they see and interact with each other. In particular, 
some evidence has been found to suggest that rather than opening students to the re-
lational knowing-as-loving that is cultivated through contemplative or noetic studies, 
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technology instead encourages them to focus on control over inter-personal interactions 
(Madell, Muncer, 2007, 137–140; cf. Pierce, 2009, 1367–1372).
For instance, the technologies with which students are most familiar and which 
they employ for their most intimate relations are designed to empower them as users in 
order that they might exert a high degree of control over their social interactions. Indeed, 
the allure and marketing success of these technologies lies, at least in part, in their ergo-
nomic capabilities—that is, in the ease with which all features of the technology might 
be personalized or shaped according to individual user preferences. Students become 
easily acclimatized to the high degree of control that these technologies afford, and it is 
precisely from within this atmosphere of control that they aspire as users to communicate 
and to commune with one another in a world-wide web of being. However, a true I-Thou 
relation is not possible where the need to control and to shape everything according to 
one’s own preferences—to tailor everything according to one’s own individual, “psy-
chomental” identity (Eliade, 1958, p. 14)—remains paramount. Indeed, the personalized 
atmosphere of technological mediation between users only reinforces what contemplative 
traditions refer to as “the illusion of self.” By contrast, immersion in a true I-Thou rela-
tion necessarily involves not the reinforcement of the psychomental “I”—the “i” that is 
marketed in the iPhone, the iMac, the iPad, and the iPod—but rather the loosening of our 
attachments to ourselves and our own preferences. Just as true education (like genuine 
dialogue) can never be child centred or teacher centred, but must instead be truth centred, 
so too must we be wary of the arc of educational reforms that express too great a fervour 
for the individualization of education according to psychomental preferences through 
technological making and mastery.
James Schall writes that, “We become luminous to ourselves only when we know 
what is not ourselves” (2006, p. 11). Schall bids us to look beyond ourselves for a mea-
sure of ourselves. Rather than remaining in the 2500 year-old stream of education that 
arises from Protagoras’ sophisticated claim that “Man is the measure of all things,” rather 
than being dazzled by modern educational reforms that ostensibly transform education, 
but in fact simply offer novel ways of measuring all things according to our own psycho-
mental states, one who genuinely pursues wisdom must seek a true Measure (Metron) of 
all things. It is for this reason that Plato writes against Protagoras in his Laws that “the 
god is the measure of all things in the highest degree” (1961, 716c). Protagoras allowed 
that Man (ho anthropos), as a species, ought to be considered as this measure, and neither 
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modern educational reforms nor the IT that supports them can be accurately described as 
a revolution in Protagorean education. Rather, they are only more of the same, and can 
perhaps be more aptly characterized as a kind of hyper-actualization of the Protagorean 
dictum, wherein not the generic Man, but the atomized individual—or for that matter, the 
individual’s own fluctuating psychomental states—is, and ought to be, the measure of all 
things. James Conroy expresses similar concerns over finding the correct measure in ed-
ucation when he criticizes “growing calls for an individualized, negotiated curriculum,” 
wherein “not man but the individual is to be the measure of all things” (2008, p. 148). 
Burniske’s solution to the sophistic of modern technological education is to say neither 
Man nor the individual, but rather Nature is the true Metron. However, following the 
ancient philosophers and the world’s wisdom traditions, even Nature cannot be its own 
measure. Contemplative seeing—that unbounded seeing that seeks the true Metron and to 
know reality as such—is the most powerful and best way of overcoming the dangers of 
the technological attitude that sees only what it has made.
Contemplation (contemplatio) as Opposed  
to Lust of the Eyes (concupiscentia oculorum)
Our fascination with IT, like our penchant for gazing upon the television, is problematic 
for a third reason. As we have seen, Thurman remarks that when we talk about seeking 
to increase and intensify contemplative mind in our culture, “we are actually talking 
about methods of transferring contemplative energies from one focus to another” (2006, 
p. 1766). Students who gaze into the screens of their laptops, their iPhones, their iPads, 
and other communications devices are certainly engaged in a kind of seeing; however, 
their surfing on these devices is by and large a distracted and inattentive gaze “in which 
sensory dissatisfaction is constantly reinforced, anger and violence is imprinted, and 
confusion and the delusion of materialism is constructed and maintained” (Thurman, 
2006, p. 1766). Indeed, the very term surfing implies sliding along the surface of things 
for the stimulation that it provides, never going down (katabasis) into the depth of things 
or deriving any insight into the things that are (ta onta). Our proclivity for such techno-
logical surfing arises as a result of our not knowing what to do with ourselves in our free 
time—that is, with this precious time of life in which students are not compelled to work 
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for a living and teachers are granted the most wonderful of all gifts in having an occupa-
tion that provides them with the opportunity to share their eagerness to pursue wisdom 
with their students and to beckon them towards the study and search for what is.
Students in school do not generally know what it really means to be in school. 
I frequently break into a smile when I pick up my youngest child from Grade 2. At the 
sound of the bell that marks the end of the day, a troupe of young boys very often bursts 
through the school doors (barely stopping to open them!) with a cheer and a roar of de-
light as though they were being released from prison. Schools—our only non-religious in-
stitutionalized places of leisure or schole—do not cultivate the experience of leisure (Lt. 
otium), with the result that the possibilty for otium is replaced by experiences of enmity 
or aversion (Lt. odium). Indeed, both teachers and students are so unfamiliar with what it 
means to engage in leisure or schole that the liberty of the socially prescibed free space 
in which true schooling might take place becomes a problem for us—a problem we most 
often address with busy work, with evermore-diverse modes of technological stimulation, 
and with numerous distractions that masquerade as engaged learning. However, what is 
needed in this situation is not more stimulation to engage learners, but rather less stim-
ulation in order to develop more careful attention so that awareness of the significance 
of schole might be generated, and so that we might begin to cultivate the experience and 
practice of schole in the classroom. What is needed is something akin to the silence dis-
cussed in the introduction to this paper that enables us to listen, to be open and receptive. 
Marilyn Nelson has commented on how the noise of technology might actually serve to 
impede this sort of listening:
How can we teach young Americans to listen to silence? The noise of our lives 
is—sometimes literally—deafening. Technology has given us the 24-hour 
soundtrack, our own background music, our “score.” . . . When do young Ameri-
cans ever experience silence? Perhaps only when they are glaring reproachfully at 
their parents with their arms folded. (2006, p. 1734)
As many academics have noted, in our current school environment, “the demands 
for constant activity, the habit of electronic stimulation, and the production orientation of 
modern society make it very difficult to keep the contemplative alive” (Hart, 2004, p. 43). 
In such an “era of fragmentation, ever-increasing speed, multi-tasking, and continuously 
interrupted attention” (Haynes, 2005, p. 8), what is needed, as Thurman suggests, is the 
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re-direction of our natural desire to see. Essentially, what is needed is the introduction of 
some form of contemplative practice into the classroom.
In my experience of student inquiry in the classroom, much of what passes for 
learning is best described by the Latin term curiositas as opposed to studiositas. The 
contrasting psychological meanings of these words are respectively “intemperate in-
quisitiveness” (curiositas) and the “temperate desire for knowledge” (studiositas). Both 
studiositas and curiositas arise from the natural wish to see. However, studiositas dis-
tinguishes itself as zealous attention in the desire to know what is; it remains true to its 
objective of seeing what is, and, for this reason, our word “study” has sometimes been 
called “a prayer to truth” (Sertillanges, 1998, p. 69). By contrast, curiositas is associated 
with meddlesomeness—the polypragmosyne or “doing-of-many-things” that the Greeks 
took as their definition of injustice. It is a kind of many-knowing that seeks out the expe-
rience and the stimulation of seeing rather than what is seen. Curiositas runs amok in the 
contemporary technological classroom where one-to-one policies make it every child’s 
right to have a networked computer at all times. Instead of being studious, students 
engage in all sorts of distractions and multi-tasking, such as playing computer games, 
social networking, watching mindless spectacles on Youtube, or even shopping online. 
Essentially, curiositas arises wherever the desire to see is not rooted in the desire to take 
up whatever is seen toward the most beautiful (kallistos) of sights. The allure of technolo-
gy for many young people is not that it engages them in learning about what is, but rather 
that it provides them with a means of escape from themselves and from the hollowness 
of being rootless in school, which, prior to computer technologies, found its release along 
other routes. Indeed, Pieper’s comments on the nature of curiositas serve as particularly 
apt descriptions of many classrooms:
The degeneration into curiositas of the natural wish to see may be much more 
than a harmless confusion on the surface of the human being. It may be the sign of 
complete rootlessness. It may mean that man has lost his capacity for living with 
himself; that, in flight from himself, nauseated and bored by the void of an interior 
life gutted by despair, he is seeking with selfish anxiety and on a thousand futile 
paths that which is given only to the noble stillness of a heart held ready for sacri-
fice and thus in possession of itself, namely the fullness of being. (1981, p. 86)
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Citing the Journals of André Gide, Pieper (1981) remarks that lacking cultivat-
ed exposure to the experience and practice of leisure, we tend to encounter time that is 
not filled with work as “deadly emptiness” and “endless ennui” (p. 122). School—but 
also life outside of school—becomes for us a kind of spiritual desert as a result of “the 
destruction of the vita contemplativa” (p. 122). We become prone in our freedom (now 
experienced as spiritual displeasure and discomfort) to seek escape—or perhaps I might 
co-opt the term “e-scape” from gerontological and management studies (Buse, 2010, p. 
987–1009; Moshinskie, 2001, p. 30–37) as it relates specifically to the use of computer 
technologies among students and educators—in the distracted movements of the interest-
ed eye that careens from one object to the next in search of novelty and titillation. This 
desire to see resembles contemplation (contemplatio) inasmuch as it is a kind of gaze. 
However, whereas the contemplative gaze seeks to know reality, the gaze of the unlei-
sured eye is, by contrast, concerned with the pleasure to be derived from seeing rather 
than the seeing of what is for its own sake.
This unleisured seeing is, effectively, what is meant in Christian philosophy by 
the phrase “lust of the eyes” (concupiscentia oculorum). Pieper writes, 
There is a gratification in seeing that reverses the original meaning of vision [i.e., 
contemplation] and works disorder in man himself. The true meaning of seeing is 
perception of reality. But “concupiscience of the eyes” does not aim to perceive 
reality, but to enjoy “seeing.” (1981, p. 86)
Augustine has written an extensive psychology of concupiscentia oculorum in his Con-
fessions. He contends that all sins are derived either singularly or from any combination 
of “lust of the flesh” or “carnal desire” (concupiscentia carnis), the “lust of the eyes” 
(concupiscentia oculorum), and the “empty pomp of living” or the “pride of life” (ambi-
tione saeculi, 1961, 10.30.41; cf. 3.8.6). Numbered among these three root categories 
of sin, concupiscentia oculorum is a “vain” or “unhealthy curiosity” (curiosa cupiditas) 
that seeks not what is truly desirable, but rather the satisfaction of its own inquisitiveness 
(1961, 10.35.54–55). Augustine sees this sort of inquisitiveness at the heart of scientific 
investigations when they are divested of any concern for the Highest Good (Summum 
Bonum), and he likens such pursuits to a kind of sorcery or magic (artes magicas) that 
seeks to obtain knowledge for perverted purposes: “not in the hope of salvation, but sim-
ply for the love of the experience” (1961, 10.35.55).
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Augustine’s psychological analysis locates the root cause of concupiscentia ocu-
lorum in the inordinate love of worldly things: in misjudging the nature of things through 
not seeking out the true Metron of all these goods in the Supreme Good, or Summum Bo-
num. His psychology is therefore deeply rooted in the tradition of Christian contemplative 
practice, which involves not the heightening of our sense of self-importance, self-regard, 
or self-love (amor sui), but rather, as Socrates describes in Plato’s Republic, a turning of 
the soul (periagoge, 1961, 518d ff) away from all these finite goods towards the one true 
good to be found in the love of wisdom. In Augustine’s estimation, this love of wisdom is 
identical with the love of God (amor Dei, 1972, VIII.1, 298). As the author of John’s first 
epistle recommends:
Do not love the world or the things in the world. The love of the Father is not in 
those who love the world; for all that is in the world—the desire of the flesh, the 
desire of the eyes, the pride in riches—comes not from the Father but from the 
world. And the world and its desire are passing away, but those who do the will of 
God live forever. (1 John 2:15–17)
For Augustine—as for all who pursue wisdom—a genuine education must be 
immortalizing. Aristotle writes that the immortalization (to athanatizein) brought about 
through contemplative practice is the precise activity of our highest happiness (eu-
daimonia).  According to Anaxagoras, contemplative practice (theoria) is what we were 
born for (Aristotle, 2001, Eudemian Ethics i.5 1216a11). In Plato’s Symposium, Dioti-
ma remarks that “it is in contemplating (theomenoi) the Beautiful Itself (auto to kalon)” 
that “human life is to be lived,” (Plato, 1961, 211d) for it is only “when a human being 
looks (blepontos) there and contemplates (theomenou) that with that by which one must 
contemplate it, and be with it” that true virtue is begotten in him, making him “dear 
to god” (theophilei), and “if any other among men is immortal (athanato), he is too” 
(Plato, 1961, 212a).
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Conclusion
Contemplation or theoria ought to take greater precedence in education than is currently 
the case. More specifically, we must encourage a noetic taking up (anairesis) of whatever 
is seen towards its ground in what is the highest or best (Ariston) of sights. Our modern 
focus on and fascination with IT serves in many ways to thwart and to discourage the 
cultivation of noetic studies and the pursuit of wisdom in schools. If the significance of 
intellectus and the cognitive movements of noesis could be made clear and convincing 
to educational policy makers, it seems likely that the appropriateness of leisure or schole 
might be recognized and its practice rendered more frequent.
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